The increasing emphasis on Human Rights as part of the global zeitgeist since 1945 has revolutionised international law and the policies of governments. Despite this, the philosophical foundations of Human Rights are not very clear. International legal instruments refer to Human Rights being based on ‘dignity’; however dignity is a slippery concept. In a world where Human Rights are of such great importance it is essential that they are properly understood. This paper will explore and critically evaluate a variety of dignity-based conceptions of Human Rights including those based on Liberalism, Deontology and Utilitarianism. It will be suggested that a number of particular conceptions standout as being the strongest which, inter alia, crucially balance carefully the interests of the community against the interests of individuals. Significantly, it shall be pointed out that while various international Human Rights instruments appear to possess the hallmarks of particular philosophical theories, some of the Human Rights included in those instruments do not necessarily reflect the result of the theory being applied. This paper will conclude by suggesting that the most appropriate view of the philosophical foundations of Human Rights is that of a mixture of the strongest dignity-based theories rather than one alone. This mixture of dignity-based theories can be viewed upon as a holistic conception of Human Rights based on human dignity. The holistic conception is of great practical importance because, inter alia, it can be used to properly identify a hierarchy of Human Rights, increase respect for them, and assist in the solving of complex Human Rights related dilemmas.
Key words: Philosophical, Foundations, Human, Rights, Dignity, Community, Individual, Liberalism, Deontology, Utilitarianism
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READ MORE...The aim of this paper is to revisit what has often been described as a watershed moment in recent feminist activism and scholarship, namely the embrace of gender-specific concerns by international human rights law and the recognition of women’s rights as human rights, which gained heightened visibility starting in the early 1990s. Gender-based violence committed in armed conflict, in particular, animated international feminist scholarship in unprecedented ways, primarily, because it was considered an obvious feminist issue, but also because feminist advocates sensed an opportunity to visibilise wartime sexual violence against women by way of international law aiming to provide legitimacy to a long marginalised phenomenon of war. In line with this development, feminist inclusion strategies, such gender mainstreaming1 that actively promote women’s visibility across the United Nations human rights machinery have assumed a central role in transforming the former absence of women from international law into part of its institutional machinery. And yet there is a sense that the triumph of gender came at a cost to women. Current feminist debates around the issue, for example, reveal a profound tension between ‘universalist feminists’, who generally endorse the jurisprudence of the tribunals and fear that any destabilisation of the female subject or critique of the law will lead to a rupturing of the perceived successes achieved and feminists advocating for critical introspection, who have mainly been sidelined from the dominant debate for fear that their concerns would lead to a renewed denial of female authenticity.2
This article aims to contribute perspective to what the visibility of gender within the international human rights machinery signifies for women in the current political and legal moment. More centrally, it questions whether the embrace of gender terminology is linked to a determination to provide legitimacy to a previously invisible subject in law, the woman. It asks whether feminism with its unequivocal lobbying for the inclusion of politically neutral terminology might have inadvertently departed from its original politics of women.
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While the article takes strides to define particular stages of the construction project lifecycle, the true emphasis is made on what those particular stages mean for the terms used in contracts therein. In many construction projects the stages even defined on the ‘critical path’ can be unique to specific projects and based on time restrictions. The issue examined here is not so much on the varying nature of construction projects, it is understood here that this is difficult to control. However, what is analysed here is the use of contractual terms, how they function, operate, and how they are interpreted by the many parties involved.
Terms are so defined so as to act as a constant in the realm of variables. This article contextualises this notion and asks why such a fixture is yet so often misinterpreted.
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